



AF 9100:2026

Aerospace Quality Management System

PROCEDURE

Governance, Delegation, Impartiality and Stop Authority

AF-PR-9100-003

FIRST EDITION

30 September 2026 | English master text

Publication identity and application

Control	Publication value
Title	Governance, Delegation, Impartiality and Stop Authority
Document code	AF-PR-9100-003
Edition / language	FIRST EDITION / English master text
Companion edition identity	30 September 2026
Controlling source	AF 9100:2026 — FIRST EDITION — 29 September 2026
Responsible owner function	Accountable executive and independent assurance function
Primary source anchors	5, B, 9.6, 22.2, 28.1, AH.2
Delivery status	Prepared implementation companion. Actual approval, adoption, effectivity and operational decisions are recorded separately.

Use and document-control boundary

This companion implements the supplied AF 9100 requirement basis without changing the original standard. Its process allocation, examples, checklists and record design are authored implementation material. Actual mission or product limits, specialist procedures, permissions and genuine observations must be completed before consequential use. Applicable source minima and independent decision conditions cannot be reduced by this companion.

The printed edition date identifies the companion series; it is not evidence that later preparation, review or operational decisions occurred on that date. New support codes in this set are proposed allocations for controlled registration. Established AF-IG-9100-001, AF-FAQ-9100-001 and AF-TR-9100-001 identities are retained; earlier files, the corporate master list and ASTRA codes are not overwritten.

Equivalent combined or digital records are permitted when all required fields, relationships, authority and history remain intact. A completed PDF field or typed name is not evidence of an authenticated approval. Blank records in this delivery contain no invented applicant, signature, event or result.

Contents and reading route

Publication identity and application	2
Contents and reading route	3
1 Scope, responsibility and source priority	4
2 Trigger, inputs and handover	4
3 Operating sequence	4
4 Decision, interruption and escalation	5
5 Required records and receiving checks	5
6 Worked case and adverse challenge	5
Appendix A — Controlling source and evidence	7
Source tables — complete field and decision payloads	11
Appendix B — Local implementation and release	13

Select actual scope → complete application criteria → use the applicable procedure and technical book → capture authentic evidence → evaluate every applicable condition → obtain the required independent decision. Document availability does not establish implementation or conformity.

1 Scope, responsibility and source priority

Applies to the responsible function and exact evaluated object selected from the source. Use only the duties triggered by actual activity and retained responsibility.

Boundary	Required implementation decision
Object and route	Identify ORG, PRD, SVC, PRC, PER, SUB or CAB separately. Combined records do not merge outcomes.
Activity	Apply source technical modules by performed or retained responsibility, including relevant outsourced work.
Authority	Technical release, employer task permission, independent attestation and statutory authorization remain distinct.
Source priority	AF 9100:2026 and all compatible binding obligations control. This companion does not import ASTRA programme rules or external normative schemes.

2 Trigger, inputs and handover

Trigger: Assignment of responsibility, delegation, material conflict, commercial pressure or a protective concern.

Accountable process owner: Accountable executive and independent assurance function. Actual named appointments and deputies are maintained locally.

Input to verify	Required output / receiving function
Exact request, object and source profile	Accepted scope and controlled work package, or a reasoned hold/refusal.
Current people, authority, data and equipment	Authorized assignment and evidence-access boundary.
Original execution, adverse evidence and source history	Attributable result, identified limitations and required action.
Relevant source clocks and actual event times	Genuine due/completion history and timely recipient communication.

3 Operating sequence

3.1 Assign actual mandates

Identify the accountable executive, management representative and relevant design, safety, production, digital, metrology and release authorities. State scope, limits, substitutes and reporting paths in written appointments.

3.2 Apply consequence-based separation

Use Annex B to distinguish ordinary review, independent technical review and organizationally independent C3 challenge. Independently check third-party decision separation even for lower criticality.

3.3 Screen interests

Examine ownership, finance, employment, consultancy, family relationships, referral incentives and shared resources. A signed declaration records inputs; an actual unmanageable conflict requires recusal, reassignment or refusal.

3.4 Control delegation

Specify delegated decisions, affected items, competence, duration, supervision and retained accountability. Confirm that supplier permissions and system access cannot enlarge the written delegation.

3.5 Protect stopping and reporting

Make hold channels usable on every shift and at remote locations. Preserve evidence and escalate loss of identity, missing critical verification or suspect material without waiting for commercial approval.

3.6 Review restart and oversight

Technical return requires evidence of cause, extent and restored controls. Scheme status and public claims are separate decisions. Examine attempted interference and act on independent dissent rather than closing it by management preference.

4 Decision, interruption and escalation

Unresolved conflicts, expired delegation or a failed essential protective control prevent the affected authorization.

State or event	Action and limit
Evidence valid and criteria met	Record the bounded result and pass it to the authorized receiving function; do not enlarge scope.
Evidence missing, invalid or inconclusive	Keep the dependent conclusion not yet demonstrated / HOLD, preserve the reason and define competent next work.
Valid evidence demonstrates failure	Record nonconformity and protect the affected population; follow actual technical disposition and source status controls.
Trigger genuinely absent	Record the exclusion and its approved responsibility basis. Resource shortages do not justify N/A.
Interrupted or changed work	Preserve prior state and actual configuration; complete impact and revalidation before claiming completion.

5 Required records and receiving checks

Document	Record purpose
AF-FR-9100-003	Competence, Independence and Assignment
AF-FR-9100-006	Nonconformity, Containment and Corrective Action
AF-FR-9100-007	Independent Review and Attestation Decision
AF-FR-9100-014	Risk, Hazard, Criticality and Residual Decision

At handover the receiver checks object, scope, current version, original evidence, open conditions, true event chronology and the action they may authorize. An email sent, field marked complete or invoice paid is not acceptance of that handover.

6 Worked case and adverse challenge

Synthetic scenario: The commercial director asks a reviewer to remove a finding to meet a delivery date.

Required reasoning: Retain the evidence-based finding, protect the release boundary and record the interference. Management may resource corrective work but cannot manufacture conformity.

Challenge before local use	Expected behavior
Missing essential input	Dependent conclusion remains held; no favorable default.
Wrong configuration or performer	Detect the mismatch and reassess relevant evidence.
Expired or conflicted authority	Block the prohibited assignment or decision; later renewal cannot validate earlier unauthorized work.
Failed mandatory condition with high total score	No compensation; preserve the failure and required action.
Correction without original history	Reject an apparent closure that erases relevant earlier evidence.

Appendix A — Controlling source and evidence

Source: AF 9100:2026, Aerospace Quality Management System, FIRST EDITION, 29 September 2026; supplied 131-page PDF. Source page references below locate the original publication. These excerpts are read with the complete applicable standard; local implementation sequences do not replace it.

5.1 Executive accountability and customer focus

SOURCE p. 15 | Normative when applicable

5.1(a) Top management shall be accountable for system effectiveness and shall integrate quality, safety, reliability and delivery obligations into business decisions. It shall provide resources, resolve cross-functional conflicts and require evidence that commitments can be fulfilled before they are accepted.

5.1(b) Top management shall ensure that customer and end-user needs, applicable obligations and foreseeable consequences are understood. Product conformity, on-time delivery, complaints, repeat escapes and effectiveness of corrective action shall be reviewed together. Delivery recovery shall not be achieved by concealing defects or bypassing release controls.

Required evidence: Executive reviews; resource decisions; commitment reviews; balanced performance measures and escalations.

5.2 Policy and measurable commitments

SOURCE p. 15 | Normative when applicable

5.2(a) The organization shall establish an approved quality and assurance policy appropriate to its scope and risks. The policy shall commit to fulfillment of applicable requirements, accurate evidence, ethical behavior, reporting of concerns and continual improvement. It shall provide a practical basis for objectives and decisions.

5.2(b) The policy shall be communicated in language and forms understood by personnel and relevant external providers. Understanding shall be evaluated through observed decisions and interviews rather than a signature alone. The current policy shall be available to relevant interested parties subject to legitimate information controls.

Required evidence: Approved policy; communication records; observed application; linked objectives.

5.3 Roles, management representative and independence

SOURCE p. 15 | Normative when applicable

5.3(a) Top management shall appoint a management representative with authority to coordinate the system, report performance and escalate unresolved quality or assurance issues directly to the accountable executive. Technical authorities for design, safety, production, software, cybersecurity and release shall be identified according to the organization's activities.

5.3(b) Personnel responsible for independent review or release shall have the competence, access and freedom necessary to challenge the work. For the criticality categories in Annex B, independence shall be demonstrated by the reporting or decision arrangement, not merely by a different job title. Conflicts of interest shall be recorded and managed.

5.3(c) Delegation shall specify scope, limitations, competence, duration and supervision. A delegated supplier or automated workflow shall not acquire authority beyond the documented delegation. The delegating organization shall monitor performance and retain the ability to suspend the delegation.

Required evidence: Authority matrix; management-representative appointment; independence arrangements; delegation register.

5.4 Ethical behavior and quality culture

SOURCE p. 16 | Normative when applicable

5.4(a) The organization shall establish behavioral expectations prohibiting falsification of test results, concealed rework, unauthorized substitutions, misleading claims and retaliation for good-faith reporting. Management incentives and production targets shall be reviewed for pressures that could undermine these expectations.

5.4(b) Personnel shall have accessible channels to raise concerns, including escalation outside the immediate production chain when necessary. The organization shall protect reporters within applicable requirements, investigate concerns impartially and communicate outcomes appropriately. An increase in reported concerns shall not automatically be interpreted as deteriorating culture.

5.4(c) Culture shall be evaluated using more than a survey score. The organization shall examine response to bad news, willingness to stop work, closure quality, recurrence, supplier treatment and management follow-through.

Required evidence: Behavior code; reporting channels; investigation records; incentive review; culture evaluation and actions.

5.5 Stop-work and release protection

SOURCE p. 16 | Normative when applicable

5.5(a) Every person performing work affecting conformity shall know how to stop or hold an unsafe or potentially nonconforming activity. Defined hold conditions shall include loss of configuration identity, unverified critical characteristics, suspect counterfeit material, compromised evidence and operation outside an approved safety envelope.

5.5(b) Restart or release shall require an authorized assessment of cause, extent, implemented controls and remaining obligations. Commercial management shall not override a technical hold without the required technical and, where applicable, customer or authority approval. The decision and evidence shall remain traceable.

Required evidence: Stop-work instruction; hold records; restart criteria and authorized decisions.

5.6 Governance of claims and external relationships

SOURCE p. 16 | Normative when applicable

5.6(a) The organization shall ensure that proposals, declarations, product literature, environmental claims and statements about certification or AF recognition are accurate, bounded and supported. A management-system assessment shall not be used as evidence of a product capability that was not evaluated.

5.6(b) Potential conflicts arising from investment, consultancy, training, supplier ownership or commercial sponsorship shall be disclosed to relevant decision makers. Any conformity decision shall remain independent of payments or membership status. Public corrections shall be made when a materially misleading claim is identified.

Required evidence: Claim-approval process; supporting evidence; conflict disclosures; correction records.

9.6 Independent assurance and systemic challenge

SOURCE p. 27 | Normative when applicable

9.6(a) For high-consequence programs, the organization shall obtain independent challenge of the assurance strategy and major release decisions at the level specified in Annex B. The review shall examine assumptions, common-cause dependencies, missing evidence and the credibility of residual-risk acceptance.

9.6(b) The independence arrangement may use qualified internal or external personnel. It shall not be weakened by allowing the designer to approve their own contested evidence without the required review. Dissenting technical opinions shall be recorded and resolved through the defined authority structure.

Required evidence: Independent-review plan; challenge records; dissent resolution; release recommendations.

22.2 Evaluation, review and decision separation

SOURCE p. 40 | Normative when applicable

22.2(a) The scheme operator shall appoint evaluators competent for the object, sector, criticality and methods involved. Technical expertise shall be added where an auditor's competence does not cover the evaluated activity. Assignment, competence and conflicts shall be checked before work begins.

22.2(b) For third-party attestation, the decision maker shall not have performed that evaluation or supplied the relevant consultancy. A competent independent person may combine evidence review and the decision, but shall not certify their own evaluation. Internal release and internal audit independence shall follow their applicable role and criticality rules, not an inappropriate assumption that every employee is independent.

Required evidence: Assignment matrix; competence and conflict checks; evaluation record; independent review and decision identities.

28.1 Legal responsibility, resources and impartiality

SOURCE p. 48 | Normative when applicable

28.1(a) The provider shall identify the legal entity responsible for its work, governance, authorized signatories, resources and arrangements for financial and professional liabilities. Its commercial model shall not condition a favorable result on purchasing consultancy, training, membership or other services.

28.1(b) Impartiality risks from ownership, employment, shared staff, referrals, finance, close relationships and previous work shall be identified, reviewed and controlled. Where a conflict cannot be reduced to an acceptable level, the assignment shall be refused or reassigned. A signed declaration alone shall not neutralize an actual conflict.

Required evidence: Legal and governance records; resource and liability arrangements; impartiality analysis; conflict decisions.

B.1 Classification method

SOURCE p. 52 | Normative when applicable

B.1(a) The organization shall classify functions, items, processes and evidence-producing tools by the highest credible consequence of their failure within the defined context. It shall consider exposure, combinations, common causes, detectability, recovery and uncertainty. Classification shall not be based only on financial value or a single multiplied risk score.

B.1(b) The classification shall be reviewed by competent technical personnel and approved by the assigned acceptance authority. Where the consequence is uncertain, the organization shall use a conservative provisional category or obtain the missing evidence before lowering assurance. An external mandatory classification shall remain applicable independently.

Required evidence: Classification record; hazard link; assumptions; reviewers; approval and change rationale.

B.2 No averaging across critical failures

SOURCE p. 52 | Normative when applicable

B.2(a) A favorable average score shall not compensate for a missing critical control, failed mandatory criterion or unsupported residual-risk acceptance. The organization shall identify release-blocking conditions and apply them before considering aggregate maturity or performance measures.

B.2(b) Quantitative safety or reliability objectives shall be derived from the applicable mission and authority basis. This annex does not prescribe universal probability targets. Evidence requirements shall consider uncertainty and the capability of the selected method to support the claimed objective.

B.2(c) The C0-C3 category controls technical assurance and surveillance intensity; it does not relax the independent review and decision requirements for a third-party attestation in Annexes AA and AD.

B.3 Example classification decision

SOURCE p. 53 | Definition, explanation or informative example; no new universal limit

B.3(a) Illustrative case: a software-controlled ground-support cart can move an expensive payload while personnel work nearby. The initial assessment identifies credible severe crush injury if unintended motion occurs. The relevant motion-control function is provisionally C2, not C0 merely because the cart is a support device. A qualified assessment may determine a different category when actual exposure and safeguards are known.

B.3(b) The example decision requires independently reviewed motion limits, verified stop functions, configuration control, operator validation and a residual-risk decision. It does not assign a universal automotive safety- integrity level or establish a certified cart design.

AH.2 Impartiality oversight and structural separation

SOURCE p. 123 | Normative when applicable

AH.2(a) The provider shall maintain a live analysis of impartiality risks, including common ownership, consultancy, product design, manufacture, financial dependence, shared staff, referral fees and outcome-linked compensation. Interested-party input shall be obtained through a balanced oversight mechanism whose members can challenge management without commercial retaliation.

AH.2(b) A body shall not independently certify work it designed or provide consultancy that compromises its subsequent independent decision. Related activities shall be identified and controlled through adequate structural and functional separation. Where effective independence cannot be demonstrated, the affected evaluation shall be refused or performed through a genuinely independent authorized arrangement.

AH.2(c) An internal inspection or test function may generate technical evidence if its relationship is declared and its competence is valid. It shall not falsely present that evidence as independent third-party certification. The required independence level shall reflect the stated claim and technical consequence.

Required evidence: Impartiality-risk register; oversight decisions; related-activity controls; declared relationships and assignment refusals.

Source tables — complete field and decision payloads

Table B-1 — AF consequence categories

Source p. 52 | Required structure when applicable

Category	Consequence basis	Minimum assurance response
C0 — Ordinary	No credible safety effect or significant mission/service consequence within the stated use.	Controlled requirements, competent execution, acceptance evidence and proportionate internal review.
C1 — Significant	Recoverable degradation, material rework or service interruption with no credible severe injury or comparable high-consequence effect.	Documented risk and interface review; verification plan; reviewer not the sole originator where practicable; defined recovery.
C2 — Critical	Credible serious injury, major mission loss, major environmental harm or prolonged loss of an essential service.	Formal hazard analysis; independent technical review; controlled critical characteristics; demonstrated mitigations; authorized residual- risk decision.
C3 — Catastrophic	Credible fatalities, catastrophic system loss with safety consequences, or comparable catastrophic harm in the applicable domain.	Organizationally independent assurance challenge; explicit safety case; rigorous evidence and configuration control; highest designated technical and accountable approvals.

Table B-2 — Tailoring dimensions

Source p. 52 | Required structure when applicable

Dimension	C0 / C1 baseline	C2 / C3 additional expectation
Requirements	Defined acceptance criteria and controlled changes.	Bidirectional traceability of safety/mission controls; independent review of derived requirements.
Design and evidence	Review appropriate to complexity.	Independent verification of critical assumptions and evidence; unresolved counter-evidence escalated.
Suppliers	Scope-based approval and monitoring.	Critical sub-tier visibility; process qualification; authenticity strategy; change and escape notification.
Measurement	Suitable method and equipment.	Uncertainty and decision risk explicitly justified for critical acceptance characteristics.
Software and AI	Controlled versions and functional verification.	Assurance independence, failure-domain analysis, robust anomaly control and bounded adaptation.

Dimension	C0 / C1 baseline	C2 / C3 additional expectation
Release	Authorized person confirms completed plan.	Critical-control completeness, safety review and independent challenge of remaining limitations.
Field support	Feedback and corrective action.	Population traceability, urgent notification, monitored safety assumptions and lifecycle support.
Change	Impact-based review.	Reopen affected safety arguments and qualification; approval at an equivalent authority level.

Appendix B — Local implementation and release

Readiness condition	Evidence before consequential use
Authority and responsibility	Actual legal operator, owner, competent technical authority, independent reviewer and permitted result class are recorded.
Scope and criteria	Object, configuration, site, period, trigger, every technical value or observable attribute, units and prospective approval are complete.
Evidence and methods	Original accessible evidence, representative observations, valid methods, uncertainty, adverse cases and limitations support the intended conclusion.
People and independence	Competence is current for each task; genuine conflicts, relevant prior work and needed separation have been checked.
Records and tools	Field meanings, unique IDs, original history, access, retention, recovery and actual deployed workflows have passed local validation.
Decision and public use	All relevant blockers are resolved; required independent decision and written permissions precede the exact public claim.
Continuity and handover	Receiving custody, unresolved duties, corrections and historical decisions survive transfer, retirement or provider closure.

Record the completed local readiness and actual authorization in AF-FR-9100-032 or an equivalent controlled record. Preserve the unchanged source standard and each earlier decision basis. A blocked activity may continue only within a genuinely permitted development boundary, not as a provisional conformity certificate.